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Direct-To-Consumer Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning health apps (DTC AI/ML health apps) are
increasingly being made available for download in app stores. However, such apps raise challenges, one of which
is providing adequate protection of consumers’ privacy. This article analyzes the privacy aspects of DTC AI/ML
health apps and suggests how consumers’ privacy could be better protected in the United States. In particular, it
discusses the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), the Federal Trade Com
mission (FTC) Act, the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, the
California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, the Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, the Colorado Privacy Act, and
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679 – GDPR). This article concludes that much more work is
needed to adequately protect the privacy of consumers using DTC AI/ML health apps. For example, while the
FTC’s recent actions to protect consumers using DTC AI/ML health apps are laudable, consumer literacy needs to
be much more promoted. Even if HIPAA is not updated, a U.S. federal privacy law that offers a high level of data
protection—similar to the EU GDPR—could close many of HIPAA’s loopholes and ensure that American con
sumers’ data collected via DTC AI/ML health apps are better protected.

1. Introduction

health apps in our daily lives [7,8]. Google also recently announced an
“AI-powered dermatology assist tool,” a web-based app planned to be
launched soon that has the potential to diagnose 288 skin conditions [9].
However, the tech giant was heavily criticized for “biased sampling,”
using a training dataset consisting mainly of images from people with
white skin and light brown skin [10]. In addition to the risk of bias in
DTC AI/ML health apps, data privacy questions related to the collection,
use, and sharing of data are becoming pressing. While there is a need to
get innovations to market faster than ever before, there are additional
risks of data breaches. According to the motto “fail fast and fix it later,”
developers may prefer to ignore data issues or solve them once the DTC
AI/ML health apps are launched rather than missing the market op
portunity [11]. It is important to promote innovation and the use of
innovative technologies but not at the expense of consumers and their
health data. Adequate protection of consumers’ privacy also fosters trust
in companies and can therefore positively impact app developers’ rev
enues in the long term.
In this article, we will explore privacy concerns raised by DTC AI/ML
health apps and suggest how consumers’ privacy could be better pro
tected in the United States (U.S.). Our suggestions may also be pertinent

The rapid development and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Ma
chine Learning (ML) in health care have brought not only enthusiasm
but also ethical and legal challenges [1]. One of these challenges is
providing adequate protection of the privacy of consumers who use
AI/ML health applications addressed directly to them for their personal
use (DTC AI/ML health apps). AI/ML is dependent on large amounts of
data, and the use and disclosure of data like health data may compro
mise consumers’ privacy. DTC AI/ML health apps are different from
other DTC health apps in that they aim to discover patterns in big
data—data characterized by the three Vs: volume, variety, and veracity
[2]—to make predictions about the probability of disease or medical
diagnosis [3]. In addition, unlike some other DTC apps, DTC health apps
collect very sensitive data concerning a person’s mental or physical
health that need extra protection.
Over 318,000 DTC health apps are already available for users to
download in app stores [4,5] some of which are based on AI/ML [6]. The
health features that the Apple Watch provides to consumers for moni
toring their heart rhythm is a popular example of the use of DTC AI/ML
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for DTC health apps in general. We will first investigate whether the U.S.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
provides (adequate) protection to consumers’ health information
collected through DTC AI/ML health apps. We will show that HIPAA
does not apply to health information collected through DTC AI/ML
health apps in most cases. We will then discuss the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act and FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule. In
particular, we will illustrate that the FTC has recently been paying close
attention to whether DTC AI/ML health app developers keep their
promises made to consumers and deal responsibly with health infor
mation. Lastly, we will look at recent legal developments at the U.S.
state level—namely the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, the
California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, the Virginia Consumer Data
Protection Act, and the Colorado Privacy Act—and, for comparative
purposes, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679 –
GDPR).
We conclude that more efforts are needed to adequately protect
American consumers’ data collected via DTC AI/ML health apps. For
example, while the FTC’s recent actions to protect consumers using DTC
AI/ML health apps are laudable, consumer literacy needs to be boosted.
Congress also needs to act and create and pass a comprehensive privacy
bill. New state privacy laws to improve consumers’ data protection are
commendable, but they add complexity for companies to comply with
all applicable rules. A U.S. federal privacy law that offers a high level of
data protection—similar to the EU GDPR—and preempts state laws with
fewer privacy protections could tremendously simplify things. Such a
law could close many of HIPAA’s loopholes and ensure that American
consumers’ data collected via DTC AI/ML health apps are better pro
tected. It could also likely make it easier to lawfully transfer data across
borders between Europe and the U.S. in the future, thereby promoting
innovation.

which data the DTC AI/ML health app developer is considered a “busi
ness associate.” For example, manufacturers of cardiac devices, such as
pacemakers or implantable cardioverter-defibrillators, are often not
considered business associates under HIPAA concerning the raw data
collected [16]. This is because the device manufacturers usually hold the
raw data, and the business associate agreements generally only cover the
data transferred to the hospitals or clinicians [16].
Second, even if DTC AI/ML health app developers may be considered
“business associates” in rare cases, HIPAA exclusively covers protected
health information. Thus, HIPAA may likely not protect all data
collected through DTC AI/ML health apps. For example, some DTC AI/
ML health apps may also collect non-health information, such as loca
tion data. Although such data may be sensitive because it allows in
ferences about the health condition of consumers (e.g., their COVID-19
risk), it falls outside of HIPAA’s scope [14,17]. Moreover, “de-identi
fied” health information is not individually identifiable health infor
mation and can be used and disclosed without limitations [13,18]. The
de-identification standard can be satisfied through either the “Expert
Determination” or the “Safe Harbor” method [19]. In a nutshell, the
former method is a qualified statistician’s determination, and the latter
method is the removal of 18 types of identifiers, such as the individual’s
name and birth date [13,20].
Third, HIPAA’s de-identification standard may not provide adequate
privacy protection and can thus be regarded as another loophole [1,14].
HIPAA’s ultimate goal to protect individually identifiable health infor
mation is not achieved when de-identified health information can easily
be re-identified. For example, even if only de-identified health infor
mation collected through DTC AI/ML health apps is freely shared with
or sold to other companies, such companies may have access to addi
tional information with which they could effectively re-identify the
de-identified health information.
This shortcoming of HIPAA was also shown in Dinerstein v. Google
[21,22]. In this case, the defendants, the University of Chicago Medical
Center and the University of Chicago, shared “de-identified” electronic
health records, including those of the plaintiff Matt Dinerstein, with
Google (also defendant) to create AI/ML-based predictive health models
[21]. As an alleged HIPAA violation, the plaintiff underlined the prob
lem of data triangulation, arguing that Google could effectively
re-identify the records because it had access to huge amounts of other
consumers’ personal information, such as Google Chrome’s web
browsing history [21,22]. However, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss,
concluding that the plaintiff could not demonstrate damages for breach
of contract [21]. This case underscores the difficulties for patients to
successfully sue medical providers for sharing their health information
with technology giants such as Google [23].

2. HIPAA and its loopholes
The HIPAA Privacy Rule is the leading national instrument in the U.
S. that establishes standards concerning the use and disclosure of
particular “individually identifiable health information” (named as
“protected health information”) [12,13]. In the context of DTC AI/ML
health apps, however, HIPAA has several loopholes.
First, HIPAA only focuses on protected health information generated
by so-called “covered entities” or “business associates.” [1,14] The term
“covered entity” exclusively applies to “a health plan,” “a health care
clearinghouse,” and “a health care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered
by” HIPAA [12]. Thus, DTC AI/ML health app developers are usually not
considered covered entities, and health information collected through
such apps fall outside of HIPAA’s scope. This loophole stems from the
fact that HIPAA was created at a time when data was generated in the
conventional health care setting, such as hospitals, rather than also
through DTC AI/ML health apps.
In a few cases, DTC AI/ML health app developers may be considered
“business associates” under HIPAA. In general, business associates are
persons or organizations that, on behalf of a covered entity, create,
maintain, receive, or transmit protected health information for an ac
tivity or function regulated by HIPAA, such as claims processing, quality
assurance, practice management, billing, and data analysis [12]. They
are not members of the workforce of covered entities [12]. Business
associates may also provide services, such as financial, administrative,
management, legal, and data aggregation, to or for a covered entity,
where the service provision includes the disclosure of protected health
information [12]. Thus, if a DTC AI/ML health app developer creates
protected health information on behalf of the covered entity, then such
data is protected under HIPAA. In this case, the two parties must enter
into a business associate agreement that contains appropriate safeguards
for the protected health information [15]. The content and drafting of
the business associate agreement play a vital role in determining for

3. FTC Act and FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule
As one of its goals, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) seeks to
protect consumers from deceptive and unfair practices in the market
place [24]. The FTC Act is the agency’s primary statute. In particular,
section 5(a) of the FTC Act bans deceptive or unfair practices or acts in or
affecting commerce. Thus, the FTC also keeps a close eye on whether
DTC AI/ML health app developers fulfill their promises to consumers
and deal with health information responsibly [25]. For example, only
recently, in June 2021, Flo Health has settled the FTC allegations made
in a complaint first announced in January 2021 that the company
violated section 5(a) of the FTC Act [26,27]. Flo Health collected
detailed information about menstruations and gynecological health of
more than 100 million female consumers with its Flo Period & Ovulation
Tracker, a DTC AI/ML health app aimed at predicting ovulation and
helping in pregnancy and childbirth [27]. Since 2016, Flo Health
seemed to have acted in violation of its own promising privacy policies
to keep consumers’ personal health information secret and shared this
sensitive data with third parties, including Google, Facebook, Flurry,
2

S. Gerke and D. Rezaeikhonakdar

Intelligence-Based Medicine 6 (2022) 100061

movement [38]. In comparison to HIPAA, the GDPR’s scope is not
limited to protected health information; instead, it generally applies to
personal data processing [39]. The GDPR also adopts a broader
approach towards “data concerning health,” defined as “personal data
related to the physical or mental health of a natural person, including
the provision of health care services, which reveal information about his
or her health status.” [40] Moreover, while the GDPR does not apply to
anonymous information, it covers personal data that has undergone
pseudonymization [41]. In general, in contrast to HIPAA, the GDPR
offers more comprehensive privacy protection to individuals, including
consumers using DTC AI/ML health apps.

and AppsFlyer [27]. The FTC finalized order required Flo Health, among
other things, to obtain the consumer’s affirmative express consent prior
to sharing their personal health information with third parties [26,28].
The FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule [29] may help to close
HIPAA’s loopholes, at least a little. This Rule applies to certain entities
that HIPAA does not cover, such as vendors of personal health record
s—i.e., electronic records that contain individually identifiable health
information received or created by health care providers and can be
drawn from multiple sources [29,30]. These entities must usually notify
the FTC and consumers in cases of a breach of unsecured identifiable
health information (“breach of security”), such as cybersecurity in
trusions or sharing consumers’ sensitive health information without
their authorization [29,30]. Due to the massive explosion in connected
devices and health apps, the FTC issued a Policy Statement on
September 15, 2021, to clarify the relevance and scope of the Health
Breach Notification Rule [30]. In particular, the FTC explains that health
app developers are considered “health care providers” under the Rule
[30]. For example, according to this Policy Statement, the FTC’s Health
Breach Notification Rule may likely apply in a case where a DTC AI/ML
blood sugar monitoring app collects consumers’ blood sugar levels
(health information) and their phone’s calendar dates (non-health in
formation), and the collected sensitive health information was disclosed
without the consumers’ authorization [30]. The FTC has so far never
enforced the Health Breach Notification Rule but intends to change that
in the future in light of the emerging field of health apps [30]. DTC
AI/ML health app developers who do not comply with this Rule may
thus face civil penalties in the amount of $43,792 per violation per day
[29,30].

5. Discussion and suggestions to better protect consumers’
privacy
HIPAA cannot catch up with the rapid development of digital health
technologies, including DTC AI/ML health apps. As seen, HIPAA is too
narrow and has major loopholes. In most cases, HIPAA does not protect
health information collected through DTC AI/ML health apps. Thus, one
suggestion to better protect consumers’ privacy could be to expand
HIPAA’s scope and eliminate the custodian requirement that HIPAAcovered entities or business associates must generate protected health
information. Furthermore, the definition of “protected health informa
tion” is too tight. One solution could be expanding this definition to also
cover non-health information that allows inferences about the health
conditions of consumers. Lastly, HIPAA’s de-identification standard
does not offer enough protection in a world that is driven by big data and
AI/ML. One approach could be that the agreement between the parties
includes language requiring the party receiving the de-identified infor
mation to keep such information separately from other datasets and
refrain from re-identification. Another approach could be that HIPAA
gives up the de-identification standard as a privacy strategy altogether.
For example, HIPAA could adopt the language of the EU GDPR and also
apply to data concerning health that has undergone pseudonymization
[40,41].
Even though having the FTC as an “enforcer” of privacy is helpful,
the agency’s current actions alone are likely not enough to adequately
protect consumers’ privacy. For example, the FTC acts and issues a
complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the FTC Act has been or is
being violated [25]. Thus, the privacy violation has likely already
occurred in the moment of its actions. However, it is encouraging to see
that the FTC has recently published guidance that contains suggestions
for consumers on how to best select and use DTC health apps [25]. The
agency also released FTC Best Practices for mobile health app developers
to help them build security and privacy into their apps [42]. The FTC’s
recent announcement that the agency intends to enforce the Health
Breach Notification Rule in cases of certain breaches by health apps is
also a welcome attempt to promote better security and protection of
consumers’ individually identifiable health information [30]. However,
much more work is still required to adequately protect the privacy of
consumers using DTC AI/ML health apps. Those additional miles needed
range from educational campaigns by agencies like the FTC to regula
tory reforms that could, among other things, require developers of DTC
AI/ML health apps to mitigate the privacy risks associated with those
apps before they are made available to consumers. In particular,
agencies like the FTC need to promote consumer literacy much more to
enable consumers to better assess cyber and privacy risks and answer
questions such as:

4. State privacy laws and the EU GDPR
To improve the privacy of consumers, California, Virginia, and Col
orado have recently enacted comprehensive state laws. The California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which became effective on January 1,
2020, gives California consumers novel privacy rights over their per
sonal information collected by businesses [31]. To further protect con
sumers’ privacy rights, the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020 or
Proposition 24 was approved by California voters on November 3, 2020,
and amends the California Consumer Privacy Act [32]. In particular, it
creates the California Privacy Protection Agency—i.e., an agency with
complete administrative power, jurisdiction, and authority to imple
ment and enforce both Acts [32]. Most California Privacy Rights Act’s
provisions will become effective on January 1, 2023. For example, the
California Privacy Rights Act will extend the current right for California
consumers to opt-out of sale of their personal information to a right to
opt-out of sharing or sale of their personal information [33].
Virginia’s Governor has also recently, on March 2, 2021, signed the
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (SB 1392) into law, which will
become effective on January 1, 2023. Like California’s privacy laws, the
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act will give consumers personal
data rights, such as the right against a controller to delete their personal
data [34]. Colorado is the third state that has joined California’s and
Virginia’s welcome initiatives to better protect consumers’ privacy and
enacted the Colorado Privacy Act (SB 190). This Act will take effect on
July 1, 2023, and will also give consumers personal data rights, such as
the right to data portability [35].
The new state privacy laws in California, Virginia, and Colorado do
not apply to protected health information governed by HIPAA [36].
However, they help improve consumers’ privacy by covering much of
the health data created and used outside the clinical setting, such as
through DTC AI/ML health apps.
All four state privacy laws were highly inspired by the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (2016/679 – GDPR), which has been applied
in all EU Member States since May 25, 2018 [37]. The GDPR contains
wide-ranging rules concerning the natural persons’ protection regarding
the processing of personal data and concerning the personal data’s free

(1) What data is collected through DTC AI/ML health apps?
(2) For what purposes are the data collected, used, or shared (e.g., for
model retraining or commercial purposes)?
(3) Is the data adequately secured against cybersecurity threats?
Moreover, although the privacy laws in California, Virginia, and
Colorado are welcome instances of state-level attempts to close some of
3
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HIPAA’s loopholes, they have one significant weakness in common:
They apply to residents of California, Virginia, and Colorado, respec
tively, and not to all Americans. They also significantly increase the
complexity for companies to comply with all applicable privacy rules
when developing DTC AI/ML health apps. Thus, having a federal law
that adequately protects the privacy of all American consumers and
preempts state laws with fewer privacy protections would enormously
simplify things [43]. The GDPR could inspire the new U.S. federal law,
which could have a broad scope covering the processing of personal
data. The new law could be applied alongside HIPAA. Even if HIPAA is
not updated, a U.S. federal law similar to the GDPR could plug many of
HIPAA’s loopholes and ensure that consumers’ data collected through
DTC AI/ML health apps are better protected across America. In addition,
such a law would likely ease cross-border transfers of personal data
between the U.S. and Europe. This is especially relevant in light of the
recent Schrems II judgment, in which the Court of Justice of the EU
struck down the so-called “Privacy Shield,” a framework that had pro
vided the possibility of lawful data transfer from Europe to the U.S [44,
45]. While a recent announcement by the European Commission and the
United States raises hopes for a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy
Framework [46], a U.S. federal law similar to the GDPR would certainly
promote data protection and further facilitate the sharing of personal
data across the Atlantic.

[8] Letter from the FDA to Apple Inc.. https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/
pdf18/DEN180044.pdf. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[9] Bui P, Liu Y. Using AI to help find answers to common skin conditions. 10
December 2021, https://blog.google/technology/health/ai-dermatology-previe
w-io-2021; 2021.
[10] Feathers T. Google’s new dermatology app wasn’t designed for people with darker
skin. 2021. https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7evmy/googles-new-dermatology
-app-wasn’t-designed-for-people-with-darker-skin. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[11] Szabo L. A reality check on artificial intelligence: are health care claims
overblown?. https://khn.org/news/a-reality-check-on-artificial-intelligence-a
re-health-care-claims-overblown. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[12] 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
[13] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Summary of the HIPAA privacy
rule. https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf. [Accessed 10
December 2021].
[14] Price II WN, Cohen IG. Privacy in the age of medical big data. Nat Med 2019;25:
37–43. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-018-0272-7.
[15] 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e).
[16] Cohen IG, Gerke S, Kramer DB. Ethical and legal implications of remote monitoring
of medical devices. Milbank Q 2020;98:1257–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/14680009.12481.
[17] Shachar C, Gerke S, Adashi EY. AI surveillance during pandemics: ethical
implementation imperatives. Hastings Cent Rep 2020;50:18–21. https://doi.org/
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[18] 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2).
[19] U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Guidance regarding methods for deidentification of protected health information in accordance with the health
insurance portability and accountability act (HIPAA) privacy rule. https://www.
hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.
html. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[20] 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) and (b).
[21] Dinerstein v. Google. LLC, 484 F. Supp. 3d 561. 2020.
[22] Dinerstein v. Google. No. 1:19-cv-04311. 2019.
[23] Becker Jenna. Insufficient protections for health data privacy: lessons from
Dinerstein v. Google. https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/28/dine
rstein-google-health-data-privacy. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[24] Federal Trade Commission. About the FTC. https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc.
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[25] Federal Trade Commission. Developer of popular women’s fertility-tracking app
settles FTC allegations that it misled consumers about the disclosure of their health
data. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/01/developer-po
pular-womens-fertility-tracking-app-settles-ftc. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[26] Federal Trade Commission. FTC finalizes order with Flo health, a fertility-tracking
app that shared sensitive health data with Facebook. Google, and Others, https:
//www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2021/06/ftc-finalizes-order-flo-hea
lth-fertility-tracking-app-shared. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[27] Federal Trade Commission. Complaint 1923133. https://www.ftc.gov/syst
em/files/documents/cases/flo_health_complaint.pdf. [Accessed 10 December
2021].
[28] Federal Trade Commission. Decision 1923133. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/192_3133_flo_health_decision_and_order.pdf. [Accessed 10
December 2021].
[29] 16 C.F.R. Part 318.
[30] Federal Trade Commission. Statement of the commission on breaches by health
apps and other connected devices. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documen
ts/rules/health-breach-notification-rule/statement_of_the_commission_on_bre
aches_by_health_apps_and_other_connected_devices.pdf. [Accessed 10 December
2021].
[31] State of California Department of Justice. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[32] State of California Department of Justice. California officials announce California
privacy protection agency board appointments. https://oag.ca.gov/news/pre
ss-releases/california-officials-announce-california-privacy-protection-agency-boar
d. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[33] Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.120.
[34] Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, § 59.1-573.
[35] Colorado Privacy Act, § 6-1-1306.
[36] Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.145; Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, § 59.1-572;
Colorado Privacy Act, § 6-1-1304.
[37] GDPR, Art. 99(2).
[38] GDPR, Art. 1(1).
[39] GDPR, Art. 2.
[40] GDPR, Art. 4(15).
[41] GDPR, Recital 26.
[42] Federal Trade Commission. Mobile health app developers: FTC best practices.
https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/mobile-health-app-developersftc-best-practices. [Accessed 10 December 2021].
[43] Gerke S, Shachar C, Chai PR, Cohen IG. Regulatory, safety, and privacy concerns of
home monitoring technologies during COVID-19. Nat Med 2020;26:1176–82.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0994-1.

6. Conclusion
The rapid development of DTC AI/ML health apps in the U.S. raises
privacy concerns. DTC AI/ML health apps collect large amounts of
sensitive data, and their use and disclosure may compromise the privacy
of consumers. Much more work is needed to adequately protect the
privacy of consumers using DTC AI/ML health apps, ranging from
educational campaigns to regulatory reforms. For example, agencies like
the FTC need to boost consumer literacy so consumers can better un
derstand, among other things, for what purposes the data collected via
DTC AI/ML health apps is used or shared (e.g., model retraining or
commercial purposes). Even if HIPAA is not revised, a U.S. federal pri
vacy law that provides an adequate level of data protection—similar to
the EU GDPR—could close many of HIPAA’s loopholes and ensure that
American consumers’ data collected via DTC AI/ML health apps are
better protected. Such a law would also likely improve cross-border
transfers of personal data between the U.S. and Europe.
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